I said that under the twin principles of reciprocity and security I would.” He asked me if I would honor the Hebron Agreement. I explained all this to Clinton when we met in the White House. Israelis were tired of voluntarily ceding things to the Palestinians and receiving terror in return. “If they’ll give, they’ll get” was the way I put it, along with a corollary: “If they won’t give, they won’t get.”2 With the exception of the hard right who wanted me to tear up the Oslo agreement outright, most right-of-center and centrist opinion agreed with my policy. I insisted that the Palestinians live up to their pledge to rein in terrorism and to jail Hamas terrorists. As Oslo was to be carried out in stages, I would proceed to the next stage, known as the Hebron Agreement, only if the Palestinians kept their side of the bargain, foremost on matters relating to security. I resolved the issue by saying that despite my grave reservations, I would honor the agreements under two conditions: Palestinian reciprocity and Israeli security. On the other, this agreement was seriously flawed and compromised Israel’s security. On the one hand, governments are guided by the continuity of international agreements. During the election campaign I had of course strongly criticized the Oslo agreements. “Practical as ever, Clinton invited me to the White House a mere three weeks after the election. They might have noted that when I did believe certain measures were vital for Israel’s future, I didn’t hesitate to take them.” ![]() So why make them? This too has eluded many American pundits. What stood in the way of the concessions I was pressed to make was simply my belief that they would greatly endanger Israel. ![]() The conflict between national necessity and political survival is as old as democracy itself, but it didn’t apply here. ![]() When such “leadership” wasn’t forthcoming from me, this was proof of a clear failure of character by a politician guided solely by cynical and personal interests. Yet this didn’t prevent American presidents and their envoys from attempting to tutor Israeli prime ministers, especially me, about the need for “courage” and “leadership.” I was being lectured about courage from people who had neither risked their own lives in war nor their political lives. Would American presidents consider taking “courageous actions,” such as, to use a historical example, far-reaching concessions to the Soviet Union if Congress could remove them from office the next day? Of course not. “The US administration constantly sought to advance its misplaced messianic quest for a magical peace via “courageous” acts on the part of Israel’s leaders, even if these acts meant political suicide. Second, it refused to really internalize that Israel’s government was dependent on a parliamentary system in which the prime minister could be toppled at any moment by the slimmest of majorities.” First, it refused to see that the core of our conflict with the Palestinians was the persistent Palestinian refusal to recognize a Jewish state in any boundary. The administration suffered from double-barreled myopia. But such was the diplomatic mind-set of Washington in those days. The democratically elected leader of the staunchest ally of the US and the leader of a terrorist organization that had murdered hundreds of Americans were put on equal footing. “Netanyahu and Arafat are both allies of the United States,” the White House briefed Israeli reporters.3 This was incredible. But this was clearly as good as it was going to get. I thought that was peculiar since the only courage Arafat displayed was the courage to receive the Palestinian neighborhoods we had transferred to his control. Clinton sent me a letter commending me for my “courage” for making a tough decision. “After the Hebron Agreement there was the briefest of honeymoons with the Clinton administration.
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